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Abstract
Most patent systems allow applicants to defer patent examination by some time.
Deferred examination was introduced in the 1960s, first at the Dutch patent office and
subsequently in many other countries, as a response to mounting backlogs of unexamined
patent applications. Some applicants allow the examination option to lapse and never
request examination once they learn about the value of their invention. Examination
loads are reduced substantially in these systems, albeit at the cost of having a large
number of pending patent applications. Economic models of patent examination and
renewal have largely ignored this important feature to date. We construct a model
of patent application, examination and renewal in which applicants have control over
the timing of examination and study the tradeoffs that applicants face. Using data
from the Canadian patent office and a simulated GMM estimator, we obtain estimates
for parameter values of the value distributions and of the learning process. We use our
estimates to assess the value of Canadian patents as well as applications. We find that a
considerable part of the value is realized before a patent is even granted. In addition, we
simulate the counterfactual impact of changes in the deferment period. The estimates
we obtain for the value of one additional year of deferment are relatively high and
may explain why some applicants embark on delay tactics (such as continuations or
divisionals) in patent systems without a statutory deferment option.
Keywords: patent, patent value, value of patent applications, patent examination, deferred patent
examination
∗INNO-tec, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität (LMU), Munich.
1 Introduction
Traditionally, the literature on the economics of innovation (e.g., Pakes and Schankerman
1984; Pakes 1986; Schankerman and Pakes 1986; Lanjouw 1998) has exploited post-grant
patent renewals to analyze the value of patents and its role in incentivizing R&D (Cornelli
and Schankerman 1999; Scotchmer 1999). We refer to patent renewal as a patentee's decision
to pay the required maintenance fees to maintain an already issued patent right. These fees
are charged by the national patent offices and are due at several points in the life of a patent.
However, the patent term does not start with the date a patent is granted but already with
the filing date of the patent application.1 Prior to the grant a patent application has to
be examined. Additionally, most patent offices allow to defer the examination request for
several years. Indeed, many patents exist longer as a pending application than as a granted
patent. Nevertheless, the timing issues in the early stages of a patent's life have largely been
neglected.
This paper addresses the research gap by providing a structural model of the application,
examination, and renewal process in patent offices. By extending previous patent renewal
models with an option to defer patent examination and by modeling examination itself in
detail, we provide a much richer foundation for patent valuation and for policy simulations
than previous studies have done. Under deferred examination, applicants have the option of
requesting examination at some point in time. Patent offices may differ with respect to the
time period during which examination can be requested as well as to the fees associated with
examination and the maintenance of patent filings. While a few patent offices, notably the
USPTO (US Patent and Trademark Office), follow a policy of automatic andif possible
immediate examination, other offices such as the German patent office offer applicants a
time period of up to seven years during which they can request examination.2 The timing of
examination constitutes one of the most startling institutional differences between different
patent systems, but it has not received much attention so far.3
The framework will further allow us to contribute to the academic debate on how to handle
patent backlogs. In the last three decades the number of patent filings has risen substantially:
partially due to the increased tactical and strategic importance (Hall and Ziedonis 2001;
F.T.C. 2003; N.R.C. 2004) and partially due to the lower costs and availability of patent
1Prior to 1995 the patent term in the US was 17 years following the grant date but was modified to 20
years following the patent application date.
2The USPTO recently announced a move towards deferred examination and to let applicants choose
from three examination tracks: the examination timing as previously offered, a fast-track option for appli-
cants seeking fast examination (similar to the option of accelerated examination at the EPO), and finally
a three-year deferment option. During this time period the USPTO would not undertake any substantive
examination. (Cf. http://www.uspto.gov/news/pr/2011/11-24.jsp for details.)
3See Harhoff (2012) for a more detailed description of deferment systems in 35 countries.
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protection (Harhoff 2006; Guellec and van Pottelsberghe 2007; Bessen and Meurer 2008). As a
consequence, the patent workload has increased substantially giving reason for concern about
its impact on examination quality. Deferred patent examination may constitute a solution
to the problem. This system was first introduced by the Dutch government on January 1,
1964 as a reaction to the vast amount of unexamined and pending patent applications. They
observed that many patents lapsed already shortly after grant despite low renewal fees. The
possibility to defer the examination request for up to seven years allowed the patentees to
abandon applications with no commercial value without any examination. Indeed, Yamauchi
and Nagaoka (2008), who try to explain the rapid increase in the number of requests for
patent examination in Japan in the recent decade, conclude that one of the causes of the
increase was the shortening of the period of examination requests. The workload of examiners
in Japan has been increased with low quality patents.
Opting for fast examination entails a number of advantages. The main argument is that
uncertainty for users of the system is reduced quickly. Both applicants and their rivals will
learn soon after the filing date about the actual delineation of patent claims and possible
infringement, and they may then adapt their investments accordingly. The argument that
uncertainty over examination outcomes and long pendencies have negative consequences is
intuitively appealing and has found some empirical support (Gans et al. 2008). Some practi-
tioners have argued that applicants are intentionally increasing the volume and complexity of
their filings, frequently delay the examination process, and thus create uncertainty for other
users of the system.4 They argue that such delay tactics should be sanctioned by patent
offices.
However, delayed examination has advantages, too. Giving applicants additional time for
assessing the value of their patents may lead them to drop out of the examination process vol-
untarily, and thus reduce examination workloads. While this effect has been discussed in the
literature for some time, it has not been captured in structural models of patent examination.
In comparison to the classical models of patent renewal, a model of deferred examination has
to allow for three possible decisions: to request examination, to defer examination, and to
let the application (respectively the granted patent) lapse altogether. We embed these three
choices in a model of applicant decision-making, allowing the applicant to make optimal
decisions in each period, given the information he has received so far, his knowledge of the
overall distribution of patent value, and its expected evolution over time. Aside from adding
an important feature to the choice set of applicants, we also employ a more detailed model of
patent examination in which the applicant may drop the application after receiving a signal
from the examiner. We allow unexamined patent applications to differ in terms of value from
examined and granted applications. In the empirical part of our paper, we use data from
4See McGinley (2008), Opperman (2009), and Harhoff and Wagner (2009).
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the Canadian patent office (CIPO) to estimate the parameters of the value distribution of
Canadian applications and of the learning process.
Our estimates of patent value match those of earlier studies. Furthermore, results reveal
that the private value of having a pending application is substantial. The returns from just
having an unexamined patent application exceed the costs for keeping it in force for the
majority of the applicants, even if they will never get a patent granted. The model estimates
also provide insights into the learning process during the application and examination stages.
Learning possibilities are relatively high and deteriorate only slowly over time.
Additionally, we employ the parameter estimates to estimate the impact of deferment on
patent office workload and on the value of unexamined as well as granted applications. The
policy experiments indicate that each additional year of deferment would significantly reduce
the number of examination requests, and hence the workload. Also, the additional time would
diminish the uncertainty about the value of inventions for which patent protection is sought,
allowing for the correct decision on whether to request examination. As a consequence,
the option to defer the examination request for one additional year increases the value of
unexamined and granted applications.
The analysis is presented in four sections. In Section 2, we develop a structural model
of deferred examination and patent renewals. Our data are described in Section 3, the
estimation approach is presented in Section 4. We conduct two simulation experiments that
allow us to identify the impact of changes in the deferment period on patent value and on
patent office workload. Section 5 concludes with a summary and a discussion.
2 Structural Model
In this section we first describe the general setup of the model, explain the structure of
the patent system, how patent applicants derive profits, and their information structure.
Subsequently we describe their optimization problem and how it can be solved.
2.1 General Setup
Patent system We construct a model of patent examination and renewal in which appli-
cants have the option to defer examination. In this section we describe the general setup
of this model. Before an agent can get patent protection for his invention he first needs
to file an official application at the patent office and pay the corresponding application fees
CApplPO . Modern patent systems require a patent to fulfill certain patentability criteria, such
as novelty and inventiveness. The application is subject to a substantive examination before
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the patent is granted.5 We assume that examination has to be requested by the applicant
within L years from the application day.6 This means that we allow the agent to defer the
examination and the associated fees for examination CExamPO for up to L years (maximum
deferment term). However, deferment is not free of charge and the agent has to pay fees
cAt (t ∈ 1, ..., L) to maintain the application pending for one more year. We assume that
once examination had been requested it takes S years for the patent examiner to completely
resolve the case and to provide the final decision on the patentability of the invention. If
examination had been requested and the application has successfully passed the examination
process the applicant can finally get the patent issued if he pays the final fee CGrntPO . A patent
gives the patentee the right to exclude others from using the patented invention. The patent
right can be renewed for up to T years (maximum patent term) from the application date
on as long as the patent owner pays the yearly renewal fees cGt (t ∈ 1, ..., T ) for the granted
patent. We assume that the maintenance fees for an application and a patent are the same
cAt = c
G
t = ct (t ∈ 1, ..., T ), and that they are non-decreasing in t.7 If any of the fees are not
paid to the patent office the application or patent expires irrevocably.
Returns The right to exclude others allows the patentee to generate non-negative returns
rt in every year the invention is protected by the patent. Since the exclusivity right is not
enforceable before the patent is finally granted, we assume that the owner of a pending
application is only able to realize a part 0 < q < 1 of the returns of an already granted
application, qrt. The parameter q must be positive, since a pending application can already
create value for its owner, e.g., by creating uncertainty for competitors or forming the basis
for negotiations.8
The returns from patent protection evolve in the following way over time. The potential
returns from patent protection in the first period, r1, are drawn i.i.d. from a continuous
distribution FIR on a positive domain. In the next period the value from patent protection
might increase or decrease depending on the information the owner obtains about his inven-
tion. The new information is represented by a growth rate gt ∈ [0, B] which is drawn from a
distribution with the cumulative density function F (u | t) = Pr [gt ≤ u | t]. Thus, the returns
in the second period are r2 = g2r1, and rt = gtrt−1 in the following ones. Since the probabil-
ity to learn how to increase the returns from patent protection should be higher for younger
5Registration systems without ex ante examination still exist in some countries, in particular for utility
models.
6We assume that all decisions are made at the beginning of a year.
7This is exactly how the maintenance fees are structured in patent systems wich offer a deferment option.
For the model to have a solution only the assumption of non-decreasing deferment fees and non-decreasing
patent renewal fees is crucial. We will discuss the implications of different structures of maintenance fees in
the conclusion.
8Patent owners are entitled to licensing fees from the day of publication. With the grant of the patent,
they can also seek injunctions against potential infringers.
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patents, we assume that the probability of having a high growth rate gt decreases with a
patent's maturity in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance (F (u | t) ≤ F (u | t+ 1)).9
Before a patent is granted it has to pass an examination at the patent office. During
this procedure the examiner has to verify whether the application fulfills the patentability
criteria. He may require the applicant to change the patent specification, or he may even
reject the application. This means that the distributions of growth rates of examined or
granted patents might be different from the ones of pending applications. In the following
let gAt ∼ FA(uA | t) denote the growth rate in case of a pending and unexamined patent
application, and gGt ∼ FG(uG | t) in case of an examined or granted patent application. To
account for cases when a patent application becomes absolutely worthless economically due
to obsolescence, we assume that in every period with some probability 1−θ all future returns
can become a zero sequence. We allow the obsolescence rate to be the same for pending as
well as granted applications. Therefore it represents the part of the uncertainty about the
value of pending and granted patent applications which is not resolved even after a patent
has been examined.
Agents We assume that every patent application belongs to exactly one profit maximizing
agent. This means that in every period the agent always chooses the strategy with the highest
expected payoff given his information structure.
At the beginning of a period the growth rate gAt , respectively g
G
t , is revealed to the agent,
so that he knows the potential returns rt from patent protection for this period. Furthermore,
we assume that he also knows the distributions of all future growth rates, and thus is able
to build expectations on how the returns will evolve in the future. Since the distributions
of growth rates from patent protection are exposed to an unexpected shock during patent
examination, the patent applicant has to readjust his expectations about future growth rates.
We assume that this change in expectations is not anticipated by the applicant. Practically,
this means that if the applicant has not yet requested application in period x, his growth rate
is drawn from FA(uA | x), and he expects the growth rates of patent returns to be distributed
according to FA(uA | t > x) in the future periods. Once he requests examination and receives
a response on the patentability of the application from the patent office, he has to adjust
his expectations on the evolution of returns from patent protection according to what was
considered patentable by the examiner. Therefore the growth rates for subsequent periods
are drawn from FG(uG | t). Usually, the value of a patent application is very uncertain. It is
not only uncertain whether the patented invention will have any commercial value but also
whether the application can fulfill the patentability requirements. Whereas the economic
9Usually, the use of an invention should be determined early in a patent's life. The probability to discover
new uses in later periods should accordingly be lower.
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uncertainty may remain throughout the life of the patent, the latter, technical uncertainty
can be resolved through examination. Hence, FA and FG should differ.
The fees which have to be paid to the patent office are only a part of the costs which are
necessary to obtain a patent. Usually, an applicant has to invest resources in addition to the
statutory fees. To properly model the choices of a representative agent during the life of a
patent application we have to account for the cost of filing a patent application CApplself (search,
draft, translation) as well as the cost incurred during the examination proceeding CExamself
(negotiations with the examiner are usually conducted with the aid of a patent attorney).
2.2 Value Functions and the Maximization Problems
As described above, the life of a patent application comprises three parts:
B the application stage, in which the agent has to decide whether to apply for patent
protection and, if he does, whether and when to request examination;
B the examination stage, in which the agent has to decide whether his application will be
fully examined and granted, or withdrawn during the examination process;
B the patent stage, in which the agent has to decide whether to renew patent protection
or to let it lapse before the expiration of its full term.
Since the model has a final horizon, the statutory patent term T , and returns are conditional
only on returns in the previous age, we will see that the model can be solved recursively
starting from the final age. Therefore, we continue in reverse chronological order by first
analyzing the patent stage, then the examination stage, and lastly the application stage.
Patent stage If a patent is already granted at the beginning of period t the owner has to
decide whether he wants to keep patent protection (K) until next period or to let it irrevocably
expire (X). His choice will depend on his expected value from both strategies V˜ K(t, rt) and
V˜ X(t, rt). The value of an expired patent is always zero, V˜
X(t, rt) = 0. The expected revenue
from renewing a granted patent is the sum of current returns from patent protection rt, less
the maintenance fees ct plus the option value of being able to renew patent protection in
the next period E
[
V˜K(t+ 1, rt+1) | rt
]
.10 With β as the discount factor between periods the
value function is:
V˜ K(t, rt) = rt − ct + βθE
[
V˜K(t+ 1, rt+1) | rt
]
(1)
10V˜ K(t, rt) denotes the value function if strategy K is chosen in year t. In contrast, V˜K(t, rt) denotes the
value function if strategy K was chosen in the previous year t−1 and the value maximizing strategy is chosen
subsequently in year t. The optimal subsequent strategy doesn't have to be K.
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Figure 1: Value Functions and Cut-off Values - Patent Stage
with
V˜K(t+ 1, rt+1) = max
[
V˜ K(t+ 1, rt+1), V˜
X(t, rt)
]
and
E
[
V˜K(t+ 1, rt+1) | rt
]
=
´
V˜K(t+ 1, u
Grt)dF
G(uG | t)
Since the agent's choice in every period is discrete, there exists a threshold return rˆt for
each period t that determines the patent owner's optimal decision (see Figure 1):
B
{
rˆKt
}T
t=S+1
: minimum patent returns needed for an agent to decide to keep (K) patent
protection in period t and not to let it expire (X). This is the solution to V˜ K(t, rt) =
V˜ X(t, rt) = 0.
11
In period t = T the option value is zero since the patent cannot be renewed anymore. Thus,
the cut-off value in the last period is rˆKT = cT .
11The proof that V˜ K(t, rt) is continuous and increasing in rt, and decreasing in t can be found in Pakes
(1986). These properties ensure that the sequence
{
rˆKt
}T
t=1
exists and is increasing in t.
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Examination stage We consider two alternative approaches of modeling the examination
stage. Assume that a complete examination of a patent application takes S years. During
this time period the examiner searches for prior art and studies the claims in the patent
application. He either approves but more often objects to some or all claims. The examiner's
objection will be outlined in a report or letter called a patent office action. The applicant has
to respond to the examiner's objections and requirements whereupon the examiner further
reconsiders and either approves or calls for further amendments. Only if the applicant has met
all requirements and overcome all objections raised by the examiner the patent application
will be allowed. Once the application has been allowed the applicant usually has to pay an
additional granting fee for the patent to issue.
One way to model the examination stage is to look at it as a process where the applicant
has the choice at the beginning of each period to continue the examination (CE) and incur
the respective costs, or to withdraw his application (W) during an ongoing examination
(Alternative I). Moreover, if the application has finally been approved as patentable, the
applicant has to confirm the grant (G) by paying the granting fees CGrntPO or he can still let
it expire. As already explained above, during the examination process the expectation of
how the future returns from patent protection evolve might change. We assume that the
applicants adjust their distributions of future growth rates right upon the receipt of the
first substantive action from the examiner.12 This action provides new information on what
is actually allowed to be granted from the examiner's perspective and is issued s (s < S)
periods after the examination has been requested. The first action is followed by a (costly)
dispute between the applicant (or representative patent attorney) and the examiner for S−s
remaining periods. We assume that these costs CExamself are incurred in equal parts during
these periods.
Assume that examination was requested in period t = a. We consider the grant decision
in period a + S first. If the applicant withdraws the examined application, then V˜ W (a +
S, ra+S) = 0. If instead he wants the patent to be granted he will have to incur costs
ca+S + C
Grnt
PO :
V˜ G(a+ S, ra+S) = ra+S − (ca+S + CGrntPO ) + βθE
[
V˜K(a+ S + 1, ra+S+1) | ra+S
]
(2)
12Clearly, if the patent examination procedure includes several substantive actions they all may lead to
an adjustment to the expectations about future returns from patent protection. Nevertheless, we do not
incorporate further adjustments into the model for two reasons. First, because we do not observe whether
further substantive actions have been issued, neither when they have been issued, nor their content. Second,
we think it is plausible to assume that the most relevant and serious objections are outlined in the first
substantive action.
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with
E
[
V˜K(a+ S + 1, ra+S+1) | ra+S
]
=
´
V˜K(a+ S + 1, u
Gra+S)dF
G(uG | a+ S)
B
{
rˆGa+S
}L
a=1
: minimum patent returns needed for the agent to allow the examined
application to be granted at age t = a + S. This is the solution to V˜ G(a + S, ra+S) =
V˜ W (a+ S, ra+S) = 0.
13
Consider the time periods after the first substantive action has been issued, t = a+ s, ..., a+
S − 1. In these periods, the patentee knows what can actually be protected by the patent.
These are also the periods when the correspondence with the examiner occurs and CExamself has
to be paid. The applicant's options are either to withdraw the application, V˜ W (t, rt) = 0, or
to continue the correspondence with the examiner:
V˜ CE(t, rt) = qrt − [ct +
CExamself
S − (s+ 1)] + βθE
[
V˜CE(t+ 1, rt+1) | rt
]
(3)
with
V˜CE(t+ 1, rt+1) =
max
[
V˜ G(t+ 1, rt+1), V˜
W (t+ 1, rt+1)
]
if t = a+ S − 1
max
[
V˜ CE(t+ 1, rt+1), V˜
W (t+ 1, rt+1)
]
if t = a+ s, ..., a+ S − 2
and
E
[
V˜CE(t+ 1, rt+1) | rt
]
=
´
V˜CE(t+ 1, u
Grt)dF
G(uG | t)
B
{
rˆCEt
}a+S−1
t=a+s
: minimum patent returns needed for the agent to continue the examination
process at age t = a+s, ..., a+S−1. This is the solution to V˜ CE(t, rt) = V˜ W (t, rt) = 0.14
The remaining periods in the examination stage are the ones right after the examination
request and before the first substantive action is issued, t = a + 1, ..., a + s − 1. Here, the
applicant hasn't yet learned the examiner's objections and assumes that the future growth
rates are drawn from FA(uA | t):
V˜ CE(t, rt) = qrt − ct + βθE
[
V˜CE(t+ 1, rt+1) | rt
]
(4)
13Similar to Pakes (1986) one can show that V˜ G(a + S, ra+S) is continuous and increasing in ra+S , and
decreasing in a. Therefore, the sequence
{
rˆGa+S
}L
a=1
exists and rˆGa+S is increasing in a.
14Similar to Pakes (1986) one can show that V˜ CE(t, rt) is continuous and increasing in rt, and decreasing
in t as well as a. Therefore,
{
rˆCEt
}a+S−1
t=a+S
must exist and rˆCEt is increasing in a as well as t.
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with
V˜CE(t+ 1, rt+1) = max
[
V˜ CE(t+ 1, rt+1), V˜
X(t+ 1, rt+1)
]
and
E
[
V˜CE(t+ 1, rt+1) | rt
]
=
´
V˜CE(t+ 1, u
Art)dF
A(uA | t)
B
{
rˆCEt
}a+s−1
t=a+1
: minimum patent returns needed for the agent to continue the examination
process at age t = a+1, ..., a+s−1. This is the solution to V˜ CE(t, rt) = V˜ W (t, rt) = 0.15
Therefore, the expected revenue from requesting examination in period t = a, V˜ E(a, ra), is:
V˜ E(a, ra) =

qra − (ca + CExamPO + CApplPO + CApplself )+
+βθE
[
V˜CE(a+ 1, ra+1) | ra
]
if a = 1
qra − (ca + CExamPO )+
+βθE
[
V˜CE(a+ 1, ra+1) | ra
]
if a = 2, ..., L+ 1
(5)
The traditional way of modeling the examination stage (Deng 2007; Serrano 2011) is to
assume that a patent examination takes S years and at the end of these periods the application
will be approved for grant with probability piGrnt or rejected with probability 1−piGrnt. This
means that once the applicant requests examination he has to continue the examination
process until the final decision of the examiner on the patentability, and if the examination
was successful, he always wants his patent to be granted. The agent might only withdraw
his application during the examination if the invention becomes obsolete, or its protection
commercially worthless. According to this view the expected value of requesting examination
in year t = a, V˜ E(a, ra) comprises the expected returns from having a pending application
minus all expected examination costs K = CExamPO + C
Exam
self + C
Grnt
PO and maintenance fees,
plus the expected returns from a pending application and the expected returns from full
patent protection in the future:
15Similar to Pakes (1986) one can show that V˜ CE(t, rt) is continuous and increasing in rt, and decreasing
in t as well as a. Therefore,
{
rˆCEt
}a+S−1
t=a+S
must exist and rˆCEt is increasing in a as well as t.
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V˜ E(a, ra) =

qra+
+βθqE(ra+1|ra) + ...+ (βθ)S−1qE(ra+S−1|ra)−
−(ca + CExamPO + CApplPO + CApplself )−
−βθca+1 − ...− (βθ)S−1(ca+S−1 + C
Exam
self
S−(s+1))+
+(βθ)SpiGrnt
(
E
[
V˜K(a+ S, ra+S) | ra
]
− CGrntPO
)
if a = 1
qra+
+βθqE(ra+1|ra) + ...+ (βθ)S−1qE(ra+S−1|ra)−
−(ca + CExamPO )−
−βθca+1 − ...− (βθ)S−1(ca+S−1 + CExamself )+
+(βθ)SpiGrnt
(
E
[
V˜K(a+ S, ra+S) | ra
]
− CGrntPO
)
if a = 2, ..., L+ 1
(6)
with
E(ra+S−1|ra) =
¯
(uAa+1 · ... · uAa+S−1 · ra)dFA(uAa+1 | a)...dFA(uAa+S−1 | a+ S − 2)
and
E
[
V˜K(a+ S, ra+S) | ra
]
=
=
¯
V˜K(a+ S, u
A
a+1 · ... · uAa+S · ra)dFA(uAa+1 | a)...dFA(uAa+S | a+ S − 1)
Application stage During the application stage the potential applicant has to decide first
whether he wants to file a patent application and, once he has decided to file an application,
whether and when to request examination. The decision to request examination can be de-
ferred for at most L periods. This means that an agent who still holds a pending application
in the beginning of period t = L+1 has to decide whether he finally wants to request exam-
ination (E) or to withdraw (W) it completely. Given the expected revenues from requesting
examination V˜ E(a, ra) from equations (5) or (6) and with V˜
W (t, rˆt) = 0 we define:
B rˆEL+1 : minimum patent returns needed for the agent to request an examination (E)
and not to withdraw (W) the application in period t = L + 1. This is the solution to
V˜ E(L+ 1, rL+1) = V˜
W (L+ 1, rL+1) = 0.
16
In earlier periods, t = 1, ..., L, the owner of a pending application has three options. Besides
the possibilities to withdraw (W) the application and to request examination (E) he can also
16One can easily show that V˜ E(L+ 1, rL+1) is continuous and increasing in rL+1, such that rˆ
E
L+1 exists.
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choose to defer (D) the decision to the next period. The expected value of the third option
V˜ D(t, rt) consists of the returns from having a pending application in this period, minus the
deferment fees and the expected returns from the option of having the same choices in the
next period:
V˜ D(t, rt) =

qrt − (ct + CApplPO + CApplself )+
+βθE
[
V˜D(t+ 1, rt+1) | rt
]
if t = 1
qrt − ct + βθE
[
V˜D(t+ 1, rt+1) | rt
]
if t = 2, ..., L
(7)
with
V˜D(t+ 1, rt+1) =
max
[
V˜ E(t+ 1, rt+1), V˜
W (t+ 1, rt+1)
]
if t = L
max
[
V˜ E(t+ 1, rt+1), V˜
D(t+ 1, rt+1), V˜
W (t+ 1, rt+1)
]
if t = 1, ..., L− 1
and
E
[
V˜D(t+ 1, rt+1) | rt
]
=
´
V˜D(t+ 1, u
Art | rt)dFA(uA | t)
Since at this stage the applicant has three options, in every period t = 1, ..., L there exist
two threshold values that determine the optimal choices (see Figure 2):
B
{
rˆDt
}L
t=1
: minimum patent returns needed for the agent to defer the decision (D) at age
t and not let it expire (W). This is the solution to V˜ D(t, rt) = V˜
W (t, rt) = 0.
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B
{
rˆEt
}L
t=1
: minimum patent returns needed for the agent to request an examination
(E) instead of deferring the decision (D) at age t. This is the solution to V˜ E(t, rt) =
V˜ D(t, rt).
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According to the study by Henkel and Jell (2010), the two main motives behind the
decision to defer examination are to create uncertainty for competitors and to gain time
for evaluation of the commercial value. Both motives are incorporated in our model. The
value of creating uncertainty in the marketplace is incorporated in the returns from patent
protection that can be already realized through a pending application, qrt. Given that the
potential returns from patent protection are not high enough to request examination the
17Similar to Pakes (1986) one can show that V˜ D(t, rt) is continuous and increasing in rt so that
{
rˆDt
}L
t=1
must exist. For t = 2, ..., L, V˜ D(t, rt) is decreasing in t. Therefore, the sequence of cut-off values
{
rˆDt
}L
t=2
is
increasing in t. In t = 1, rˆD1 might be higher than in the subsequent periods, since the applicant has to incur
additional costs for the application (CApplPO + C
Appl
self ).
18Since V˜ E(t, rt) and V˜
D(t, rt) are continuous in rt, so must be V˜
E(t, rt) − V˜ D(t, rt). The proof that
V˜ E(t, rt) − V˜ D(t, rt) is increasing in rt can be found in Appendix A.1. Thus, the sequence
{
rˆEt
}L
t=1
must
exist.
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Figure 2: Value Functions and Cut-off Values - Application Stage prior to Examination
Request
14
applicant will choose to defer examination either if qrt is high or the option value of future
returns is high enough (, gain time for evaluation).
Since the problem described above is finite and returns in one period depend only on
returns realized in the previous period, the model can be solved for the sequences of the
cut-off values by backward recursion.19
3 Data
For our estimations we are using data on Canadian patent applications.20 In particular, we
analyze 211,550 patent applications filed between October 1, 1989 and September 30, 1996
with information from years 1989-2008. Patent protection could be renewed for up to 20
years from the application, T = 20. On October 1, 1989 renewal fees had been introduced
for the first time, and until September 30, 1996 the examination request had to be made
within 7 years from the filing date of the application, L = 7. Since Canada is a PCT (Patent
Cooperation Treaty) member, applications which had gone through the PCT route only
entered the national stage at the CIPO (Canadian Intellectual Property Office) 30 months
after their priority date (which is typically 18 months from the application at the Canadian
patent office). In turn, information on applications which had directly been submitted at
the CIPO is available from the first day on. Furthermore, a different fee schedule applies for
international applications to get examined. Therefore, we exclude all PCT applications from
the data and use only 137,397 CIPO patent applications. Besides the date of the application,
for each application we observe the date when examination was requested or the application
withdrawn. In case examination had been requested, the data include information about
the grant date or the date of withdrawal during examination. For granted patents we also
observe when the patent owner stopped paying the renewal fees and the patent lapsed.
As one can see in Figure 3, on average, about 30,000 applications were submitted each year
at the Canadian IP Office.21 In 1990 almost 69% of all Canadian patent applications took
the national application route through the CIPO, of which 74% have requested examination
within the deferment period. In 1995 the portion of applications taking the national route
decreased to 38% with almost 90% requesting examination. The average grant rate, defined
as the percentage of applications that have successfully gone through a patent examination
19See Appendix A.2 for a sketch how the model is solved recursively.
20In a companion paper Harhoff (2012) studies the policy reforms at the Canadian Intellectual Property
Office (CIPO) in more detail. Canada switched in 1989 from a US-style system with publication at grant
to a seven-year deferment system with publication of the unexamined application after 18 months. In 1996,
CIPO reduced the deferment period to five years.
21For cohorts 1989 and 1996 only patents filed between October and December 1989, respectively January
and September 1996, were affected by the change to the patent system.
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Figure 3: Canadian Patent Applications by Filing Year (1989-1995)
out of those that had actually requested examination was 68.71%. 22 According to the CIPO
Annual Reports, 80% percent of applications with a request for examination were waiting
less than 2 years for a first substantive examination action (including all known objections to
patentability). On average, a patent was granted about 4 years after examination had been
requested. Hence, we set s = 2 and S = 4.
Cost structure The maintenance fees at the CIPO for pending applications, as well as
patents, were zero in the first two years, 100 CAD$ for years 3-5, 150 CAD$ for years 6-10,
200 CAD$ for years 11-15, and 400 CAD$ for years 16-20.23 There was one change in the
nominal fee schedule which was applied to renewals starting from January 1, 2004. The
22There was some variation within cohorts. The grant rate lied slightly above 70% and remained rather
stable for applications for which examination has been requested within the deferment period. Only when
examination had been requested at the end of the deferment period the grant rate dropped to 64%. Nev-
ertheless we maintain the assumption that there is no selection into grant rates throughout the paper in
order to not overcomplecate the model. Grant rates may also vary across technologies and applicant types
(see Schankerman 1998). However, in this paper we aggregate over all non-PCT applications and maintain
a common grant rate.
23Indeed, the fee structure is different for small and large applicants. By CIPO's definition, a small
applicant is an entity that employs 50 or fewer employees or that is a university. Small applicants are offered
a 50% reduction on application and maintenance fees. Unfortunately, we are not able to distinguish between
small and large entities. Nevertheless, small applications consist of less than 15% of total applications.
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maintenance fees were increased by 50 CAD$ for the years 6-20. To ease the computational
burden, we have used the weighted average of the maintenance fees before and after the
change in the fee structure for estimation. The fee for filing an application amounted to 200
CAD$ and 400 CAD$ for requesting examination for the cohorts under consideration. A
final fee of 300 CAD$ was due for the publication of the grant.24
As already mentioned above, it would be incorrect to assume that the decisions made
during the application and examination stage depend solely on the statutory patent fees.
To have a rough estimate we use the information on the costs of filing a patent application
in Canada provided by Canadian law firms.25 According to this information the costs of
examination range from 750 CAD$ to 7,500 CAD$ depending on the complexity and the
number of arguments put forward by the examiner. The filing costs may have even a higher
variation depending on its length, whether it requires translation from other languages, and
whether the applicant does a search to find out whether anyone else has already thought of
the idea to be patented. We decided to set CExamself to 3,000 CAD$ such that C
Exam
PO +C
Exam
self +
CGrntPO = 250 + 3000 + 450 = 3700 CAD$.
4 Estimation
4.1 Estimation Strategy
We use a simulated minimum distance estimator developed by McFadden (1989) and Pakes
and Polland (1989) for the estimation.26 In the first step we assign a stochastic specification
to our structural model by making functional form assumptions which in turn will depend on
a vector of parameters ω. In order to determine the vector ω0 of the true parameters we fit
the hazard probabilities derived from the theoretical model to the true hazard proportions
as proposed in Lanjouw (1998). Each parameter has a different effect on the structure of the
sequences of the cut-off values derived from the model,
{
rˆjt
}
with j = E,D,CE,G,K and
the distribution of returns in each age, rt, which in turn determine the hazard probabilities.
This allows the identification of the model parameters. Although in theory a solution to the
structural model, i.e., the sequences
{
rˆjt
}
can be found analytically, this is hardly possible in
practice due to the complexity of the model. Thus, we use a weighted simulated minimum
24To make the cost structure more realistic we have added 50 CAD$ to each payment due to the patent
office. Usually patent attorneys charge their clients for these money transfer services or the applicant has at
least to invest time for the completion of the respective forms. Since these costs can vary a lot we regard 50
CAD$ as a lower bound.
25See for example http://www.valuetechconsulting.com/cost.php, last accessed December 2012.
26McFadden (1989) and Pakes and Polland (1989) provide conditions required to ensure the consistency and
asymptotic normality of the estimator. Pakes (1986) and Lanjouw (1998) show that the required conditions
hold for our type of model.
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distance estimator (SGMM) ωˆN . The estimator is the argument that minimizes the norm
of the distance between the vector of true and simulated hazard proportions. We use a
weighting matrix A(ω) to improve the efficiency of the estimator:
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A(ω) ‖hN − ηN(ω)‖ with ωˆ∗N = arg min
ω
A(ω) ‖hN − ηN(ω)‖ (8)
B hN is the vector of sample or true hazard proportions.
B ηN(ω) is the vector of simulated hazard proportions (predicted by the model).
B A(ω) = diag
√
n/N is the weighting matrix. n is the vector of the number of patents
in the sample for the relevant age-cohort. N is the sample size.
In order to calculate the simulated hazard rates for a parameter set ω we first have to
calculate the sequences of the cut-off values
{
rˆjt
}
with j = E,D,CE,G,K. To do so we
proceed recursively by first determining the value functions in the last period and calculating
the corresponding cut-off values. Subsequently, with these cut-off values, we calculate the
value functions in the second last period and proceed recursively in the same manner until
the first period. Once we have calculated the cut-off functions for all periods we perform
five simulations. In each simulation we take 3 · N pseudo random draws from the initial
distribution and exactly the same amount of draws from each distribution of the growth rates
gAt and g
G
t . Afterwards we pass the initial draws through the stochastic process, compare
them with the corresponding cut-off values, and calculate the hazard proportions for all years.
The vector of hazard rates from each simulation is then averaged over the five simulation
draws and inserted in the objective function (8). The objective function is then minimized
using a two step approach. We use global optimization algorithms in the first step and
a Nelder-Mead-type local optimization search algorithm to find the local minimum in the
second step.27
We will fit three types of hazard proportions: (1) HRE, the percentage of applications
for which examination was requested, (2) HRD, the percentage of applications which were
deferred to the next period in a given year out of those that had been deferred in the previous
period, and (3) HRX , the hazard proportion of expired patents. There are two possible ways
to calculate HRX depending on the way we model the examination stage. According to the
traditional view (Version 1 assuming piGrnt < 1), HR
1
X is the percentage of granted patents
that expire in a given year out of those granted and renewed in the previous period. But
if we explicitly model the examination stage, then HR2X (Version 2 with piGrnt = 1) is the
percentage of all granted patents and applications under examination that expire in a given
27MATLAB (matrix laboratory) is a numerical computing environment developed by MathWorks. Since
the objective function is supposed to be non-smooth we apply the Simulated Annealing algorithm and the
Genetic algorithm in the first step. Both are probabilistic search algorithms (see description of the Global
Optimization Toolbox for MATLAB). The Nelder-Mead-type search algorithm implemented in MATLAB is
called fminsearch.
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year out of those applications that have already requested examination and patents which
are still alive.
We decided to use only the traditional way of modeling the examination stage for the
estimation. The reason is that estimation of both alternatives requires us to assume the
same duration of patent examination S for all applications. If we the way of modeling
the examination stage where we do not distinguish between patents under examination and
already granted patents (Alternative I) we will get biased results. In reality examination
patents can be examined within 2 years or examination can even take more than 10 years
meaning that S is rather heterogenous. Assuming a constant duration of examination of
four years for all patents thus leads to simulated hazard rates HR2X(t) whose composition of
patents still under examination and already granted patents would mismatch the composition
of the real hazard rates. Assume that examination was requested in the third period and
the patent has already been granted after 2 years. This will reduce the hazard rate in the
fifth year HR2X(5). Since by assumption such a low duration of examination is not possible,
the model trying to fit this hazard rate will be adjusted by allowing more applications which
requested examination in the first year to be granted or more patents to be renewed. A similar
reasoning applies to patents which were examined longer than 4 years and not granted.28
This kind of bias is avoided if we use the traditional way of modeling the examination stage
(Alternative II), since the hazard rates which we use for the estimation only include patents
which are already granted HRX = HR
1
X . They do not depend on the duration of the patent
examination.
Since for the applications in our data the maximum deferment period was 7 years, we
calculate HRD for 7 periods and HRE for 8 periods for each of the seven cohorts. The
decision to request examination can be made anytime within the 7 years period. Therefore
we assign all requests which were made within the first 6 months past the filing date of the
application to the first period and all requests which were made in the following 12 months
to the second period, and so forth.29 The maximum patent term in Canada was 20 years but
since we only observe events before the end of 2008 the vector HR1X(t) consists of 15 entries
for cohort 1989 and 8 for cohort 1996 (beginning with period 5).
Furthermore, we do not consider the application decision for our final estimation. The
reason is that the estimation results, especially the parameters of the initial distribution,
will highly depend on the costs of filing an application. Since we do not observe these costs
28To avoid this kind of bias one could restrict the sample to applications which had never requested
examination and applications which had requested examination but were either granted only after 4 years or
were dropped less than 4 years after the request. But we refrained from sub-sampling the data in this way,
since this approach could introduce an even stronger bias and considerably restrict the validity of our results.
29A few recording dates for the examination request exceeded 7.5 years. We assigned these decisions to
the 8th period.
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and they tend to vary considerably across patents, incorporating this decision might bias the
estimation results.30
4.2 Stochastic Specification
Initial returns As in previous patent renewal studies31 we assume that the initial returns
r1 of all applications are lognormally distributed where FIR(µIR, σIR) is a normal distribution
with mean µIR and variance σIR:
32
log(r1) ∼ Normal(µIR, σIR) (9)
Distributions of the growth rates For the growth rates during the years before the
patent has been examined we follow a similar stochastic specification as in Pakes (1986). We
assume that the realized growth of returns is the maximum between the minimum growth
rate δA, and a growth rate which is drawn from an exponential distribution vA with variance
σit = (φ
i)t−1σi0: g
A
t = max(δ
A, vA). The second growth rate, vA , represents the cases when
the applicant is able to learn about how to increase the returns above the minimum growth
rates. We also assume that φA < 1 such that the probability of getting higher returns will
decrease with age t. The overall distribution of gAt can be represented as follows:
gAt ∼ FA(uA | t) =
1− θ if 0 ≤ uA < δA1− θ + θ(1− exp(−uA
σAt
)) if δA ≤ uA
(10)
We model the evolution of the growth rates during the patent stage, FG(uG | t), in
a more static way. We assume that learning possibilities disappear once the patent has
been examined.33 This means that uncertainty about future returns from patent protection
30To our knowledge Deng (2011) is the only one who has estimated a dynamic stochastic patent renewal
model incorporating the application decision for European patent filings. She has only considered the statu-
tory application and granting fees at the European Patent Office (EPO) for estimation and disregarded the
costs of drafting and translating EPO patent applications. These costs usually exceed the statutory fees and
vary considerably across technology areas as well as applicant types.
31See for example Pakes (1986).
32Lanjouw (1998) was the only one who deviated from this assumption. She assumed that the initial
returns of patents applications is zero and its value only evolves over time.
33We have also estimated a competing model where we explicitly allowed for learning opportunities during
the patent stage. This dynamic model provided a somewhat better fit to the data since the evolution of
returns during the patent stage was now determined by three parameters φG, σG0 , δ
G instead of a single one
δG. The increased fit could be fully attributed to adjustments in the simulated HRX(t). All other parameters
remained in a narrow range of the presented model. Apart from the value distributions, which have become
more skewed due to the additional learning opportunities, all results presented below, in particular the
qualitative ones, continue to hold. The reason why we have chosen the more static model for the following
analysis is that the identification of φG, σG0 , δ
G relies solely on the variation in HRX(t) and the variation in
the patent renewal fees. We cannot fully exclude offsetting effects between these three parameters.
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completely disappears after the grant. The evolution of returns is then fully deterministic
and they depreciate at a constant rate δG.
To ease the computational burden we fix the discount rate β = 0.95. Furthermore, since
the first weighted hazard rate of expiration (HRX for period 5) is 0.0465, we set θ = 0.9535.
Year 5 is when the first patent applications are granted. Therefore, we find it plausible to
assume that patents from a cohort which are granted first expire in the first year after grant
because of obsolescence and not because of too high renewal fees. The maintenance fees for
the fifth year amount to only 100 CAD$. Since the fraction of applications which were granted
out of those that had requested examination was 68.71%, the probability that an application
which has not become obsolete during the examination process will be successfully granted
is: piGrnt =
0.6871
θS−1 =
0.6871
0.95353
= 79.26%.
With q as the fraction of returns an application can generate already before grant we are
left with seven structural parameters to be estimated:
q, µIR, σIR, φ
A, σA0 , δ
A, δG
These parameters altogether determine the structure of the sequences of the cut-off values
derived above, rˆjt with j = E,D,K, and the distribution of returns in each period, rt.
4.3 Identification
Like in other patent renewal models the parameters are identified by the cost structure
and the non-linearity of the model. Different parameter values imply different cut-off value
functions which in turn imply different hazard rates.
In particular, the parameters µIR and σIR determine the mean and variance of the initial
distribution of returns. Both have an effect on all three sequences of hazard rates. Variation
in σIR results in changes in HRE(t) in the first and last year, and changes in HRD(t) in
the first and third year, but leaves the hazard rates in the other years rather unchanged. In
contrast, variation in µIR changes HRE(t) and HRD(t) in all years. Interestingly, whereas
higher values of µIR result in a higher hazard rate of deferment in the third period HRD(3),
the period when the first maintenance fees are due, higher variance σIR has the opposite
effect.
The parameter q, which represents the fraction of the returns from patent protection which
can be realized with an unexamined patent application, is mainly identified by the variation
in HRD(t), and especially in HRE(t). A higher q raises the hazard rates of deferment for all
years almost constantly whereas it increases the hazard proportion of requesting examination
only in the last, eighth year and decreases them for years 1 to 7. A lower q would have the
opposite effect.
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The distributions of growth rates of returns from pending applications FA(uA | t) are
fully determined by φA, σA0 , and δ
A. The parameters φA and σA0 have similar impact on all
three hazard rates. Higher values of parameters go along with higher hazards of examination
request in all years and lower hazard of deferment except for the third year, HRD(3), where
it leads to an increase. Different values of φA and σA0 have also an impact on the curve
of the hazards of expiration. Higher values produce a concave curve such that the hazard
proportions decline or remain constant for older patents. Lower values produce a convex curve
with increasing hazard proportions for older patents. This is the consequence of constant
maintenance fees for the years 16-20. Nevertheless, there is a difference between variation
in φA and variation in σA0 . Higher values of the first parameter imply increasing hazard
proportions of examination request for the years 2-7 whereas higher values of the latter
imply decreasing hazards for the same years and vice versa. δA, together with the other two
parameters determine from what year on the hazard proportions of expiration, HRX(t), start
to exceed the rate of obsolescence. Furthermore, a higher depreciation rate, i.e., lower δA,
decreases HRE(t) in all years. It also decreases HRD(t), but only for periods 3 to 7, when
maintenance fees are due, but increases HRD(t) in the first two periods.
δG determines the evolution of returns of already examined patent applications, FG(uG |
t). Therefore δG does neither impact HRD(t) nor HRE(t), and is identified by the variation
in HRX(t) only.
As with other renewal models, the main caveat of our estimates is the sensitivity to the
functional forms assumed for the distribution of returns. As Lanjouw (1998) notes: Unlike
the patents which are dropped, and which thereby indicate that they have expected returns
at that point bounded above by the renewal fee, there is no information in the data which
directly identifies an upper bound on the returns generated by patents which renew until
the statutory term. The value of the patents in this group is identified indirectly by the
functional form assumptions, together with the fact that the potential for high returns in the
future influences renewal decisions in the early years.
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Parameter Estimates (s.e.)
β (fixed) 0.9500 -
θ (fixed) 0.9535 -
µIR 5.9015 (0.0491)
σIR 1.8865 (0.0222)
q 0.7307 (0.0032)
φA 0.9659 (0.0011)
σA0 1.4090 (0.0238)
δA 0.8400 (0.0101)
δG 0.9363 (0.0026)
Age-Cohort Cells 212
Size of Sample 137,427
Size of Simulation 412,281
V arAll(hN ) 0.117316
MSEAll
† 0.000855
1−MSEAll/V arAll(hN ) 99.27%
V arE(hN ) 0.050834
MSEE 0.000115
V arD(hN ) 0.002848
MSED 0.000154
V arX(hN ) 0.000586
MSEX 0.000619
†MSE is the sum of squared residuals divided by the number of age-cohort cells.
Table 1: Parameter Estimates
4.4 Estimation Results
The estimation results are presented in Table 1.34
Fit of the model To get an indication of how well the estimated model fits the data, we
compare the simulated with the sample hazard proportions. Furthermore, we also report
how much of the variability in the sample hazard proportions can be explained by the model.
Figures 4-6 show the simulated and sample hazard rates from the pooled data. By looking at
the hazard proportions of examination requests and declarations, HRE(t) and HRD(t), one
can see that there are no major deviations between the empirical and simulated moments.
The model seems to capture all sharp increases as well as decreases. The mean square errors
(MSEE and MSED) are low compared to the variance in the actual hazard proportions
(V arE(hN) and V arD(hN)). Only 5.41%, respectively 0.23% of the variance in the actual
34A sketch of how the value functions and the cut-off values have been calculated can be found in Appendix
A.2. We are using a parametric bootstrap method to obtain the standard errors as described in Appendix
A.3.
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hazard proportions is not accounted for by the model. For the hazards of expiration, however,
the model overpredicts the hazard proportions for the years 12 and 16, and underpredicts
them in all others. Consequently, the mean square error, MSEX , is high compared to the
variance. Why the model performs poorly in explaining the variation in HRX(t) may lie in
the assumptions we have made regarding the cost structure and the duration of examination.
The kink in year 16 coincides with the year when the official renewal fees almost double and
then stay the same for the following years. However, the real costs associated with patent
renewal might be much higher such that the official renewal fees represent only a fraction of
them. This might explain why we do not observe a kink in the actual hazard proportions.35
The jump in year 12 is due to our assumption that examination takes exactly 4 years for all
applications and applicants always proceed the examination unless the application becomes
completely worthless. According to our model, owners of patents of lower economic value
defer examination until the last deferment period, and then decide whether to request it.
If they request examination the patent will be granted exactly 4 years later. However, for
many of these patents the value will have depreciated such that the renewal fees in year 12
will exceed the expected returns. In reality, the duration of examination is heterogeneous
and the decision whether to continue examination might be endogenous as well. Therefore,
the patent lapses the model predicts for year 12 are allocated around this year in the actual
data. Furthermore, we have assumed that the examination costs are the same for all appli-
cants. However, the actual examination costs should differ across applicants. Applicants with
patents of lesser economic value should have requested examination earlier than predicted
by the model if their examination costs were low enough. Applicants with higher examina-
tion costs should have postponed the examination request or even dropped the application
although their applications were relatively valuable. Therefore, we observe higher hazard
proportions of expiration especially for younger patents in the sample compared to the ones
predicted by the model.36 Nevertheless, the overall MSEAll is very low, suggesting that our
estimated model fits the data well and is able to explain 99.27% of the overall variation.
Estimated parameters We now turn to the discussion of the estimated model parame-
ters.37 The initial distribution of returns is determined by µIR and σIR, and implies a mean
initial potential return from patent protection for all applications of 2,155 CAD$ (122 CAD$)
35Another possible explanation is that the assumption of a constant rate of obsolescence for all granted
patent applications might be unrealistic. An increasing rate of obsolescence for older patents might provide
a better fit for the progression of the hazard proportions of expiration but would make calculations and
identification more difficult.
36One possible way to alleviate this bias is to assume that the costs of examination are proportional to
the duration of examination. The examination costs would then simply be a function of the duration of
examination making them heterogeneous across applicants. However, the problem arises how to assign a
duration to applications for which examination has never been requested, or which have never been granted.
37All monetary values are in units of 2002 CAD$. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis.
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Figure 4: Simulation vs. Sample Hazard Proportions HRE(t)
and a median value of 365 CAD$ (17 CAD$). The parameters φA, σA0 , and δ
A determine
the evolution of returns during the application stage. The implication of these parameters,
especially of φA being close to 1, is that before an application is examined the applicants
expect high and slowly decreasing learning opportunities. If an applicant is not able to learn
how to increase the returns from his patent application the next years returns depreciate by
16%. In Table 2 we see that 53.9% of pending patent applications in the second year and still
46.8% in the eighth year are able to increase the potential returns from patent protection
and defy depreciation. Interestingly, although learning opportunities for Canadian patent
applications diminish with age, they do it at a much slower pace as estimated for granted
patent applications by previous patent renewal studies. For example, Pakes (1986) reports
that learning is over by age 5 for German patents. Lanjouw (1998) estimates a similar speed
of learning. This shows that the uncertainty underlying pending patent applications is high
and is resolved only slowly over time.
The parameter q, which was defined as the fraction of potential returns from patent
protection that can already be realized before the patent is finally granted, is estimated to be
73.1%. Although the applicant practically has not yet gained the right to enforce his right to
exclude others, he is able to profit from having a pending application. This means that even
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Figure 5: Simulation vs. Sample Hazard Proportions HRD(t)
Age 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Pr(gAt ≥ δA) 53.95% 52.78% 51.61% 50.41% 49.21% 47.99% 46.76%
(s.e.) (0.81%) (0.79%) (0.77%) (0.75%) (0.73%) (0.71%) (0.69%)
Table 2: Learning Possibilities During the Application Stage
though he might never receive a patent on his invention, the realized value might still exceed
the expenses. Since we assumed that there are no learning possibilities for already examined
patent applications, the returns from full patent protection depreciate at 1− δG = 6.39% per
year.
5 Implications
Value of Canadian patent applications In this section we use the estimated parameters
to calculate the value distributions of Canadian patent applications for the 1989 cohort.
We simulate the patent system by taking 250,000 pseudo-random draws from the initial
distributions and passing them through the model using the estimated parameter values.
Then, the net value of protection defined as the discounted present values of the streams of
returns less the discounted maintenance fees was calculated for each simulated application.
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Figure 6: Simulation vs. Sample Hazard Proportions HRX(t)
In case the application was still pending we multiplied the return in the respective period by
q and in case examination had been requested we subtracted the discounted costs incurred
for examination.
Table 3 presents the simulated value distributions for all patent applications, for appli-
cations which have been granted, and for applications which have not been granted. All
monetary values are in 2002 CAD$. Similar to previous renewal studies, we find that the
value distributions are highly skewed. The median simulated application value is 2,132 CAD$,
whereas the mean value is 25,743 CAD$. Less than 10% of all applications are worth more
than 50,870 CAD$ and less than 0.1% are worth more than 1,705,073 CAD$.
Unsurprisingly, there is a huge difference between patents and not granted applications.
The average value of a patent is 50,954 CAD$. 50% are worth more than 15,361 CAD$ and
1% even more than 615,681 CAD$. These numbers confirm the results of previous patent
renewal studies for other countries (Serrano 2006 for the USA; Deng 2007 for EPO patent
applications). Patent applications which have never been granted were worth 4,547 CAD$
on average. Interestingly, the median value is positive with 184 CAD$.
Additionally, we are able to report what part of the value is generated before and what
part after a patent has been granted. It seems that on average a patent owner is able to realize
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All Patents Not Granted
Percentile Applications Overall Value Before Grant† Applications
50 2,132 15,361 42.15% 184
(s.e.) (213) (794) (0.54%) (36)
75 16,299 40,096 66.06% 2,093
(s.e.) (894) (1,915) (0.36%) (203)
90 50,870 99,029 88.97% 8,457
(s.e.) (2,535) (4,721) (0.51%) (701)
95 97,697 178,425 100.00% 17,445
(s.e.) (4,844) (9,284) (-) (1,281)
99 362,397 615,681 100.00% 70,463
(s.e.) (21,352) (40,859) (-) (5,076)
99.9 1,705,073 2,654,362 100.00% 400,452
(s.e.) (125,165) (225,414) (-) (30,818)
Mean Value 25,743 50,954 50.38% 4,547
(s.e.) (1,536) (2,961) (0.43%) (393)
†Calculated as the fraction of returns which accrued before the patent had been granted.
We did not subtract any costs to avoid negative numbers.
Table 3: Value Distributions for Cohort 1989 in 2002 CAD$
50.38% of the overall value already during the application and examination stages. Only less
than 50% of all patents have realized more than 67.85% of the overall value during the patent
stage. These are mostly patents which have requested examination very early. Owners of
more than 5% of granted patent applications had only been able to accrue value during the
application and examination stages. These patents became worthless shortly before or after
they had been granted.
Withdrawn or not granted patent applications account for 54.33% of all patent appli-
cations. According to the simulation results, the owners of these applications do not make
losses on average. Since applicants can profit from a pending application and realize 73.07%
of potential returns from patent protection already before the patent issues, even the 50th
percentile is positive. The other reason why we observe positive values for not granted
patent applications is that some of them have become obsolete or failed examination in spite
of having generated high returns in the past.
Value of deferment Now, we use the estimated parameters to shed light on the role of
the possibility to defer the examination request. We calculate the vectors of cut-off values for
two additional patent systems: one which allows deferment for up to six years, and one for
up to five. Using the same simulated cohort of applications as in the previous section with a
patent system which allows deferment for up to seven years, we calculate and compare the
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Age L = 5 L = 6 L = 7
1 58,914 (262)† 58,091 (250) 57,460 (240)
2 14,226 (199) 14,007 (201) 13,846 (202)
3 11,383 (116) 11,142 (128) 10,986 (128)
4 9,464 (89) 9,095 (99) 8,872 (115)
5 8,361 (88) 7,835 (94) 7,562 (108)
6 76,998 (292) 7,096 (96) 6,715 (102)
7 64,959 (276) 6,055 (97)
8 54,267 (270)∑
179,346 (352) 172,225 (338) 165,763 (340)
†Standard errors in parenthesis.
Table 4: Examination Requests
value distributions across the patent systems. This allows us to calculate the option value of
the possibility to defer the examination request for one additional year. Furthermore, we also
compare the number of total examination requests and assess the implications of different
lengths of deferment for the patent office's workload.
Table 4 presents the simulated numbers of patent examination requests for the years
examination can be requested. The table shows that the overall number of requests increases
if we shorten the deferment period. It will increase by 4.13% (0.083%) if we reduce the
period of request for examination by one year and by 8.19% (0.150%) if we reduce it by two
years. This is consistent with the analysis by Yamauchi and Nagaoka (2008) who observed
a significant increase in the number of requests for patent examinations in Japan, while the
number of patent applications remained rather stable. They show empirically that one of
the major causes of the increase was the shortening of the deferral period from 7 to only 3
years. The difference is highest in the last period in which examination can be requested.
In the patent system with a maximum deferment period of five years 46.93% of all ex-
aminations were requested in the last year, whereas in the patent system with a maximum
deferment period of seven years only 32.74%. The explanation is that applicants are given
additional time to evaluate their invention and unveil the uncertainty surrounding it. The
additional deferment period permits two types of corrections. First, it allows those applica-
tions that become obsolete or are exposed to value depreciation in the following year not to
request costly examination. Second, applicants may learn that their inventions are capable
of generating higher returns and still request examination.
The effect on the value distributions of the simulated patent cohort is consistent with
the effect on the number of examination requests. Since examination is requested early for
patents which are known to be valuable as early as at the application date, patents in the top
percentiles of the distribution are not affected by the extended deferment period. However,
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change in the 5← 7 years 6← 7 years
value/ all applications -5.49% -2.56%
(s.e.) (0.168%) (0.080%)
value/ patents -4.81% -2.25%
(s.e.) (0.152%) (0.081%)
mean value/ patents -11.99% -5.93%
(s.e.) (0.398%) (0.178%)
value/ not granted applications -11.86% -5.56%
(s.e.) (0.561%) (0.283%)
mean value/ not granted applications -5.37% -2.34%
(s.e.) (0.660%) (0.321%)
Table 5: Option Value of Deferment
a shorter deferment period reduces the effect of both correction mechanisms. Many owners
of applications with initially low returns are deprived of additional time to reevaluate the
value of their inventions and to request examination in case they would have discovered a
way to increase them. Besides, applications which devaluate in the sixth or the seventh year
nevertheless request examination since they have to decide before this information is revealed
to them. As presented in Table 5 the value of all patents decreases by 2.25% if we shorten the
deferment period by one year and by 4.81% if we shorten it by two years. Since the number
of examination requests increases if we reduce the maximum deferment period, the decrease
in the average patent value is even higher.
The value of applications which have been withdrawn or have failed examination decreases
by 2.34%, respectively 5.37%, on average. More applicants request examination and incur
costs for the examination if the deferment period is shortened. Consequently, the value of all
patent applications in the cohort falls by even 5.56%, respectively 11.86%.
6 Conclusion
The model developed in this paper is the first to embed the option of deferred patent ex-
amination in the context of stochastic optimization. We utilize the rich information from
deferment and renewal actions to estimate parameters of the value distribution of Canadian
patent applications and granted patents, as well as of the associated learning process. Knowl-
edge of these parameters allows us to perform two simulation experiments and to study the
impact of the timing of examination on the patent office's capacity problem as well as on the
value of unexamined and granted patents.
Our first main finding is that a substantial part of the value from patent protection
is generated in the time before a patent gets actually granted. We estimate that already
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during the application and examination stages an owner of a pending patent application
is able to realize 73.09% of the returns he would generate if he had full patent protection.
As a consequence, the majority of Canadian patent applications which have never been
granted have a positive discounted value. Furthermore, the learning process of the value of
applications which are still pending is much slower compared to the one of granted patents
studied in previous literature.
In addition, our model allows us to simulate a change in the patent system from a seven
years to a five years deferment period. This experiment is particularly interesting considering
that the maximum deferment period in the Canadian patent system was indeed shortened
from seven to five years for applications filed on or after October 1, 1996. The simulation
experiment resulted in an increase in the number of examination requests which have to be
dealt with at the Canadian patent office by 8.19%.38 The applicants were deprived of time
necessary to reduce the uncertainty associated with the value of their inventions. Therefore,
many applications which would have turned out to be valuable in the future were withdrawn.
Even more applicants decided to request examination and incur the corresponding costs al-
though they would have become worthless shortly after. We estimate a considerable negative
impact on the value of unexamined as well as granted patents, as a consequence.
Although we have used data on Canadian patent applications the results ought to be valid
for other patent systems as well. A possibility to defer the examination request does not only
reduce the patent office's workload but also acts as a quality control mechanism. Applicants
seeking patent protection for inventions with highly uncertain value have the possibility to
defer the examination request after the uncertainty has been resolved. Nevertheless, delayed
examination may create additional possibilities for applicants to act strategically and increase
uncertainty in the marketplace. However, to constrain strategic behavior by applicants most
countries allow third parties to request examination and impose a fee on this activation right
to prevent abuses. Concern has also been expressed that deferred patent examination could
potentially increase patent filing rates. Indeed, our estimates show that for many patent
applications returns realized during the application stage have been high enough to cover
even the application costs. Nevertheless, an increase in the number of high-quality filings
should not give cause for concern. To avoid an increase in poor-quality filings one could
either try to raise the quality threshold for initial filings, involve third parties, or use the
deferment fee structure as an additional policy instrument weeding out such applications.
The literature on the optimal renewal fees starting with Cornelli and Schankerman (1999)
38In reality the number of patent examination requests for Canadian applications has increased by about
6.9% after the reform. The deviation from the estimated percentage number may arise out of three reasons:
1) The simulated results apply to 1989 applications. 2) We do not take potential consequences of the policy
intervention for the application filing decision into account. 3) We have used data on applications which were
filed directly with the Canadian patent office for estimation and excluded all PCT applications.
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and Scotchmer (1999) has identified the renewal structure as a direct revelation mechanism.
Assuming heterogeneity in R&D productivity across firms and information asymmetry on
the part of the government, optimal patent renewal fees should be low in early years and rise
sharply with patent length. Baudry and Dumont (2009) arrive at the same conclusion for the
welfare optimizing one profile fits all renewal fees. Nevertheless, both studies disregard the
fact that in many patent systems the patent renewal fees constitute only a part of the total
statutory fees. Our framework incorporates application fees, deferment fees, as well as patent
renewal fees. Assuming a particular welfare function which relates the deadweight loss to the
private value from patent protection, one could try to determine the welfare optimizing cost
structure taking into account the interplay between the different types of fees. For example
Cornelli and Schankerman (1999) report that the optimal patent renewal schedule should be
more sharply graduated if there is post-patent learning, compared to the case when there is no
uncertainty about the value of the invention. If we assume that applicants defer examination
because they are highly uncertain about the value of their invention, then welfare could be
increased by applying different schemes to deferment fees and patent renewal fees. Thus, the
model developed in this paper provides the suitable framework for tackling these research
questions in a more comprehensive manner.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof that V˜ E(t, rt)− V˜ D(t, rt) is increasing in rt
The proof is done by induction for the traditional way of modeling the examination stage.
The proof for the alternative way of modeling the examination stage is identical to setting
piGrnt = 1.
We know that V˜ E(t, rt), V˜
D(t, rt), V˜
K(t, rt) are continuous and increasing in rt. Assume
that q < piGrnt and without loss of generality that the examination period takes only one
year (S = 1).
Consider period t = a = L first:
V˜ E(L, rL) = qrL−(cL+CExamPO +CExamself +βθpiGrntCGrntPO )+βθpiGrntE
[
V˜K(L+ 1, rL+1) | rL
]
;
V˜ D(L, rL) = qrL − cL + βθE
[
V˜D(L+ 1, rL+1) | rL
]
;
V˜ K(L+ 1, rL+1) = rL+1 − cL+1 + βθE
[
V˜K(L+ 2, rL+2) | rL+1
]
.
We show that V˜ E(L, rL)− V˜ D(L, rL) + (CExamPO +CExamself + βθpiGrntCGrntPO ) is increasing in
rL:
V˜ E(L, rL)− V˜ D(L, rL) + (CExamPO + CExamself + βθpiGrntCGrntPO ) =
= βθ
{
piGrntE
[
V˜K(L+ 1, rL+1) | rL
]
− E
[
V˜D(L+ 1, rL+1) | rL
]}
=
= βθ{piGrntE
[
max
(
V˜ K(L+ 1, rL+1), V˜
X(L+ 1, rL+1)
)
| rL
]
−
−E
[
max
[
V˜ E(L+ 1, rL+1), V˜
W (L+ 1, rL+1)
]
| rL
]
} =,
and since deferring examination is not possible in t = L+ 1,
= βθ{E
[
max
(
piGrntV˜
K(L+ 1, rL+1), 0
)
| rL
]
− E
[
max
(
V˜ E(L+ 1, rL+1), 0
)
| rL
]
}.
Since rL+1 = gL+1rL it suffices to show that piGrntV˜
K(L + 1, rL+1) − V˜ E(L + 1, rL+1) is
increasing in rL+1 ≥ 0:
piGrntV˜
K(L+ 1, rL+1)− V˜ E(L+ 1, rL+1) =
= piGrntrL+1 − piGrntcL+1 + piGrntβθE
[
V˜K(L+ 2, rL+2) | rL+1
]
− qrL+1+
+(cL+1 + C
Exam
PO + C
Exam
self + βθpiGrntC
Grnt
PO )− βθpiGrntE
[
V˜K(L+ 2, rL+2) | rL+1
]
=
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= piGrntrL+1 − qrL+1 + piGrntβθE
[
V˜K(L+ 2, rL+2) | rL+1
]
−
−βθpiGrntE
[
V˜K(L+ 2, rL+2) | rL+1
]
+(cL+C
Exam
PO +C
Exam
self +βθpiGrntC
Grnt
PO )−piGrntcL+1 =
= (piGrnt − q)rL+1 + CExamPO + CExamself + βθpiGrntCGrntPO ) + (1− piGrnt)cL+1 ,
and increasing in rL+1 ≥ 0.
Now, consider periods t = 1, ..., L− 1:
V˜ E(t, rt) = qrt − (ct +CExamPO +CExamself + βθpiGrntCGrntPO ) + βθpiGrntE
[
V˜K(t+ 1, rt+1) | rt
]
;
V˜ D(t, rt) = qrt − ct + βθE
[
V˜D(t+ 1, rt+1) | rt
]
;
V˜ K(t+ 1, rt+1) = rt+1 − ct+1 + βθE
[
V˜K(t+ 2, rt+2) | rt+1
]
.
Assume that V˜ E(t+ 1, rt+1)− V˜ D(t+ 1, rt+1) is increasing in rt+1.
We have to show that with this assumption,
V˜ E(t, rt)− V˜ D(t, rt) + (CExamPO + CExamself + βθpiGrntCGrntPO ) is increasing in rt.
V˜ E(t, rt)− V˜ D(t, rt) + (CExamPO + CExamself + βθpiGrntCGrntPO ) =
= βθ{piGrntE
[
V˜K(t+ 1, rt+1) | rt
]
− E
[
V˜D(t+ 1, rt+1) | rt
]
} =
= βθ{E
[
max
(
piGrntV˜
K(t+ 1, rt+1), 0
)
| rt
]
−
−E
[
max
(
V˜ E(t+ 1, rt+1), V˜
D(t+ 1, rt+1), 0
)
| rt
]
}.
Since piGrntV˜
K(t+ 1, rt+1)− V˜ E(t+ 1, rt+1) =
= (piGrnt− q)rt+1+CExamPO +CExamself +βθpiGrntCGrntPO )+ (1−piGrnt)ct+1 is increasing in rt+1,
and by assumption V˜ E(t+ 1, rt+1)− V˜ D(t+ 1, rt+1) is increasing in rt+1,
then piGrntV˜
K(t+ 1, rt+1)− V˜ D(t+ 1, rt+1) must also be increasing in rt+1.
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Given that rt+1 is increasing in rt, V˜
E(t, rt)− V˜ D(t, rt) must also be increasing in rt and
the proof is complete.
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A.2 Value Functions and Cut-off Values
Here, we present a sketch of how the value functions and the cut-off values can be calculated
assuming L = 7, S = 1 and K expected examination costs. The presentation is general
and not restricted to a specific type of stochastic specification or assumptions concerning the
examination stage.
Periods 2-20 if patent is already granted: (gt = g
G
t ∼ FGt (uGT ))
Period 20:
V˜ K(20, r20) = r20 − c20 = gG20r19 − c20;
Cut-off value:
V˜ K(20, r20) = 0⇒ rˆK20 = c20 (respectively gˆK20 = c20rG19 ).
Period 19:
V˜ K(19, r19) = r19 − c19 + θβ
B´
gˆK20
V˜ K(20, r20)dF
G
20(u
G
20) =
= r19 − c19 + θβ
B´
c20
rG19
(uG20r19 − c20)dFG20(uG20);
Cut-off value:
V˜ K(19, r19) = 0⇒ rˆK19 (respectively gˆK19 = rˆ
K
19
r18
).
Period 18:
V˜ K(18, r18) = r18 − c18 + θβ
B´
gˆK19
V˜ K(19, r19)dF
G
19(u
G
19) =
= r18 − c18 + θβ
B´
gˆK19
[
uG19r18 − c19 + θβ{
B´
gˆK20
(uG20r19 − c20)dFG20(uG20)}
]
dFG19(u
G
19) =
= r18 − c18 + θβ
B´
rˆK19
rG18
uG19r18 − c19 + θβ{ B´
c20
uG19r
G
18
(uG20u
G
19r18 − c20)dFG20(uG20)
 dFG19(uG19);
Cut-off value:
V˜ K(18, r18) = 0⇒ rˆK18 (respectively gˆK18 = rˆ
K
18
r17
).
Period 17:
...
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Periods 1-8 in case of a pending application: (gt = g
A
t ∼ FAt (uAt ))
Since the shock on the growth rate during the examination is unexpected one also has to
calculate V˜ Kt (t, rt) and rˆ
K
t (respectively gˆ
K
t ), t ∈ 2, ..., 20 assuming gt = gAt ∼ FAt (uAt ) since
these are the returns the applicants expect to receive in future periods. These value functions
and cut-off values are then used for the calculation of value functions of the applicant.
Period 8
if examination is requested:
V˜ E(8, r8) = qr8 −K − c8 + θβpiGrnt
B´
gˆK9
V˜ K(9, r9)dF
A
9 (u
A
9 ) =
= qr8 −K − c8 + θβpiGrnt
B´
rˆK9
r8
V˜ K9 (9, g
A
9 r8)dF
A
9 (u
A
9 );
cut-off value:39
V˜ E8 (8, r8) = 0⇒ rˆE8 (respectively gˆE8 = rˆ
E
8
r7
).
Period 7
if examination is requested:
V˜ E7 (7, r7) = qr7 −K − c7 + θβpiGrnt
B´
rˆK8
r7
V˜ K8 (8, g
A
8 r7)dF
A
8 (u
A
8 );
if examination is deferred:
V˜ D7 (7, r7) = qr7 − c7 + θβpiGrnt
B´
rˆE8
r7
V˜ E8 (8, g
A
8 r7)dF
A
8 (u
A
8 );
cut-off values:
V˜ D7 (7, r7) = 0⇒ rˆD7 (respectively gˆD7 = rˆ
D
7
r6
);
V˜ E7 (7, r7) = V˜
D
7 (7, r7)⇒ rˆE7 (respectively gˆE7 = rˆ
E
7
r6
).
Period 6
if examination is requested:
V˜ E6 (6, r6) = qr6 −K − c6 + θβpiGrnt
B´
rˆK7
r6
V˜ K7 (7, g
A
7 r6)dF
A
6 (u
A
6 );
if examination is deferred:
V˜ D6 (6, r6) = qr6 − c6 + θβpiGrnt
B´
rˆE7
r6
V˜ E7 (7, g
A
7 r6)dF
A
7 (u
A
7 ) +
rˆE7
r6´
rˆD7
r6
V˜ D7 (7, g
A
7 r6)dF
A
7 (u
A
7 );
Cut-off value:
V˜ D6 (6, r6) = 0⇒ rˆD6 ;
39Deferment is not possible anymore.
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V˜ E6 (6, r6) = V˜
D
6 (6, r6)⇒ rˆE6 .
Period 5
...
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A.3 Parametric Bootstrap
Since we do not know the empirical distribution of the observed hazard rates we will apply a
parametric bootstrap method to estimate the standard errors of the parameters ω. Instead
of simulating bootstrap samples that are i.i.d. from the empirical distribution as it is done
in non-parametric bootstrap methods we simulate bootstrap samples that are i.i.d. from the
estimated parametric model. Following Efron and Tibshirani (1993) we apply the following
bootstrap algorithm:
1. Use the estimated parameters ωˆ∗ and generate a random sample of N patent applica-
tions.
2. Simulate the decisions resulting from the model specification and obtain the sequence
of pseudo hazard rates η(ωˆ∗).
3. Minimize the loss function in 8 using η(ωˆ∗) instead of hN and obtain ωˆ∗b .
4. Repeat the steps 1.-3. B times.
5. Calculate the parametric bootstrap estimate of standard error:
sˆeB =

B∑
b=1
[ωˆ∗b − ωˆ∗(.)]2
(B − 1)

1
2
, where ωˆ∗(.) =
∑B
b=1 ωˆ
∗
b
B
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